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How to Perform Crisis: A Model for
Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in
Contemporary Populism
A focus on crisis is a mainstay of the literature on contemporary populism.
However, the links between populism and crisis remain under-theorized and
undeveloped. This article puts forward a novel perspective for understanding this
relationship, arguing that crisis does not just trigger populism, but that populism
also attempts to act as a trigger for crisis. This is because crises are always medi-
ated and ‘performed’. The article presents a six-step model of how populist actors
‘perform’ crisis, drawing on empirical examples from Europe, Latin America,
North America and the Asia-Paciﬁc region. It explains how the performance of
crisis allows populist actors to pit ‘the people’ against a dangerous other, radically
simplify the terrain of political debate and advocate strong leadership. It ultimately
suggests that we should move from thinking of crisis as something purely external
to populism, towards thinking about the performance of crisis as an internal core
feature of populism.
‘Crisis’ being a vague term, it is easily coined and devalued. Thus it is not
difﬁcult to associate ‘populism’ (or almost anything else) with ‘crisis’. There is
also a tautological tendency to impute populism (or anything else) to ‘crisis’, as
if ‘crisis’ were a discernible cause, when, in fact, it is often a loose description of
a bundle of phenomena. Disaggregation sometimes reveals that it was not
‘crisis’ which generated populism (or mobilisation, rebellion, etc.), but rather
populism (or mobilisation, rebellion, etc.) which generated crisis. (Knight 1998: 227,
emphasis mine)
IT APPEARS THAT WE ARE WELL AND TRULY LIVING IN THE AGE OF CRISES. THE
global ﬁnancial crisis has entered its seventh year; the eurozone
sovereign-debt crisis is threatening the very existence of the European
Union; and more widely, we are allegedly suffering from a crisis of faith
in democracy (Crouch 2004; Zakaria 2013). In such a situation, it would
seem that the stage has been set for populists to sweep in, appeal to ‘the
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people’ and enjoy great success by capitalizing on a general loss of faith
and disaffection with politicians, the elite and representative politics
in general.
To some extent, this has occurred: Beppe Grillo’s Five Star
Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) made a stunning political debut in
Italy, capturing approximately a quarter of the overall vote in the
2013 federal elections; populist parties in Scandinavia have enjoyed
a steady rise in popularity, while in Latin America, Rafael Correa
has been re-elected for a third term as president in Ecuador, and
Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro will continue to ﬂy the Chávista
ﬂag as a follower of former president Hugo Chávez. Yet elsewhere,
populists are not doing so well in these times of crisis. The US Tea
Party is ﬂailing following the humiliating defeat of a number of their
star candidates; despite her best efforts, Australia’s Pauline Hanson
has not been able to gain political ofﬁce since the late 1990s; and in
many countries allegedly undergoing crises, populist challengers have
simply not emerged. This mixed evidence from across the world
suggests a need to challenge the received wisdom regarding the causal
relationship between populism and crisis, which tends to argue that
crisis acts as either an external trigger or a necessary precondition
of populism.
In this light, this article offers a new perspective on the relationship
between populism and crisis, arguing that rather than just thinking
about crisis as a trigger of populism, we should also think about how
populism attempts to act as a trigger for crisis. This is due to the fact
that crises are never ‘neutral’ phenomena, but must be mediated and
‘performed’ by certain actors. It argues that populist actors actively
participate in the ‘spectacularization of failure’ that underlies crisis,
allowing them to pit ‘the people’ against a dangerous other, radically
simplify the terms and terrain of political debate and advocate strong
leadership and quick political action to stave off or solve the impending
crisis. In making this argument, the article suggests that we should
move from a conception of crisis as something that is purely external
to populism, to one that acknowledges the performance of crisis as
an internal feature of populism. In other words, if we do not have the
performance of crisis, we do not have populism.
To put this position forward, the ﬁrst section of this article
examines accounts of the relationship between crisis and populism in
the contemporary literature on populism, demonstrating that most
dominant approaches continue to posit crisis as external to populism,
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and outlining some of the problems presented by this conception of
crisis. The second section examines the concept of crisis, arguing
that any deﬁnition of the phenomenon must take account of the
necessary role of mediation, performance and spectacularization.
The third section then presents a six-step model of how populist
actors go about performing crisis, drawing on empirical examples of
populists from across the world and explaining how this differs from
other forms of ‘crisis politics’. In doing so, this article seeks to ﬁll a
signiﬁcant lacuna in the literature on populism – the fact that no
journal article, to my knowledge, directly addresses the relationship
between populism and crisis as its central focus.
CURRENT APPROACHES TO POPULISM AND CRISIS
Approaches to the role of crisis in contemporary populist literature
can be viewed on a spectrum. There are those authors who clearly
draw a link between crisis and the emergence of populism, those who
are unsure about the causal link and a small few who actually argue
that there is little to no link at all between the two phenomena. What
connects each of these approaches is a persistent conception of crisis
as external to populism. These positions are outlined below.
The strongest advocate for linking crisis to populism is Ernesto
Laclau (1977, 2005a, 2005b), whose work presents populism as a
particular political logic. For Laclau, populism simply cannot emerge
without crisis: in his earlier writings he argued that ‘the emergence of
populism is historically linked to a crisis of the dominant ideological
discourse, which in turn is part of more general social crisis’ (Laclau
1977: 175). More recently he has argued that ‘some degree of crisis . . . is
a necessary precondition for populism’ (Laclau 2005a: 177). Indeed, he
goes so far as to claim that a number of historical ﬁgures would have
remained sidelined without crisis paving their way:
Without the slump of the 1930s, Hitler would have remained a vociferous
fringe ringleader. Without the crisis of the Fourth Republic around the
Algerian war, De Gaulle’s appeal would have remained as unheard as it had
been in 1946. And without the progressive erosion of the oligarchical system
in the Argentina of the 1930s, the rise of Perón would have been unthinkable.
(Laclau 2005a: 177)
More widely, Laclau (2005a: 139) claims that ‘the crisis of repre-
sentation . . . is at the root of any populist, anti-institutional outburst’.
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Put bluntly, for Laclau, populism does not emerge or succeed with-
out crisis spurring it into existence.
Those analysts of populism inﬂuenced by the work of Laclau
(often working under the Essex School approach to discourse)1 take
a similar tack, tending to see crisis as offering a ‘break’ in hegemonic
discourses, thus opening a space for counter-discourses (such as
populism) to emerge. For example, Yannis Stavrakakis (2005: 247)
argues that ‘the emergence of new discourses and new identities is
always related to the dislocation or crisis of previously hegemonic
discursive orders . . . this is also the case with populist discourses’, and
traces the emergence of a religious populist discourse in Greece
in the early 2000s to a sense of crisis around Greece joining the
European Economic Community. In a similar sense, Chantal Mouffe
(2005a, 2005b) links populism to a crisis of political representation
and the emergence of ‘post-politics’, while Sebastián Barros (2005:
269) links Menemism to a sense of terminal crisis.2
Strong causal links between crisis and populism are also evident in
the contemporary literature on Latin American populism, particularly
among those who view populism as a mode of organization or strategy.
For example, Kenneth Roberts (1995: 113) argues that populism ‘surges
most strongly in contexts of crisis or profound social transformation,
when pre-existing patterns of authority or institutional referents lose
their capacity to structure the political behaviour and identities
of popular sectors’, and he has linked Chávez’s rise to a ‘crisis of
Venezuelan democracy’ (Roberts 2012: 138). Others have speciﬁcally
focused on the role of crisis in neopopulism: Kurt Weyland (1999: 395)
has argued that crises ‘trigger the emergence of neoliberal populism’
and, in reference to the cases of Argentina’s Carlos Menem, Brazil’s
Fernando Collor and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, argues that ‘absent
deep crises, these candidates would have had little chance to win
government power’. Elsewhere, Steven Levitsky and James Loxton
(2012: 165) have claimed that ‘Fujimori’s rise from obscurity to the
presidency was rooted in a triple crisis’ – crises of popular representa-
tion, the economy and security. These authors see external crises as
providing an opportunity for populist politicians to step in with their
charismatic authority, ﬂex their muscles and undertake extensive and
dramatic reform in order to ‘sweep away the detritus of the past and
usher in a new social order’ (Roberts 1995: 113). They posit crisis as a
necessary (or at least extremely conducive) precondition for the
emergence of populism.
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Less sure about the link between crisis and populism are those
authors working within the ideological ‘minimal’ approach to popu-
lism. The key advocate of this approach, Cas Mudde (2007: 205), has
acknowledged that ‘emphasis on the vital role of “crisis” is a constant in
studies of both historical and contemporary nativism and populism’.
However, he criticizes this literature on the grounds that ‘most authors
do not bother to articulate what constitutes a crisis’, meaning that
the concept has remained vague and imprecise, and thus of limited
analytic value. Nonetheless, Mudde does not believe that the concept
should be rejected, as there does seem to be some signiﬁcant corre-
lation between variables we might associate with crisis – for example,
economic instability, unemployment and political dissatisfaction – and
the electoral success of European radical right populists in the
empirical literature. However, as Mudde (2007: 205) notes, ‘the key
problem in this literature is the relationship between these variables
and the overarching concept of crisis’ – that is, these variables do not
automatically equal crisis. More so, Mudde reminds us that nearly
every modern political era has been alleged to be in crisis: for example,
the 1950s and 1960s saw the ‘end of ideology’, the 1970s experienced a
participation crisis, the 1980s saw the crisis of political parties, while the
contemporary period has been marked by a crisis of political faith or
trust, linked to cartelization, clientelism and corruption. If crises are a
permanent ﬁxture of contemporary politics, it makes it difﬁcult to
make claims about populism being an extraordinary phenomenon
that only arises periodically during crisis. Overall, Mudde remains
relatively agnostic on the question of crisis and populism.
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, another key advocate of the ideo-
logical approach, has also expressed reservations about how easily
crisis can be linked to populism. He suggests that the ‘crisis’ view of
populism ﬁts snugly into what he calls the ‘liberal approach’ to
populism. Within this approach, populism is viewed as a democratic
pathology, with Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 186) noting that the concept
is framed similarly to the view of crisis in the European nationalism
literature – as something that only emerges when democracy falters.
Yet, as he notes, the types of ‘modernization losers’ hypotheses (for
example, Betz 1994; Kriesi 1999) that argue that votes for populists
come from those who suffer from the ‘objective indicators’ of crisis
often do not stand up to empirical analysis: ‘populist radical right
parties have shown a great success precisely in those regions of
Europe where the structural prerequisites for their rise were hardly
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existent’ (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 188). As such, a conception of crisis
within populism cannot only be structural, but must also refer to
more subjective indicators, such as feelings of status loss (Lipset
1960) and moral collapse (Taggart 2000). Overall, while the adher-
ents of the ideological approach do acknowledge the role of crisis in
‘setting the scene’ for populism, they do not see the relationship
between the two as necessarily causal.
The third group of authors are those who reject outright the link
between crisis and populism. Alan Knight (1998: 227) argues that
crisis is ‘a vague, promiscuously used, under-theorised concept which
deﬁes measurement and lacks explanatory power’, and that the link
between populism and crisis ‘may often be historically valid, but it
does not afford a robust etiology . . . this association is at best a rough
tendency or correlation’. Benjamin Arditi (2007: 63) is equally sus-
picious of the link between populism and crisis, arguing that ‘the
reference to “crisis” also narrows down the scope of the populist
experience to moments when politics fails to address participatory,
distributive or other demands . . . the emphasis on the exception does
not allow us to differentiate populist politics in opposition from
populism in government’. He is interested here in how populist actors,
especially when in positions of power, are able to govern without an
‘external’ crisis to trigger their appeal within the electorate.
Despite their differences, all of these approaches – whether
arguing for strong, weak or no causality at all in regard to the rela-
tionship between crisis and populism – perceive crisis as external to
populism. That is, crisis is considered as a phenomenon that does (or
does not) cause, spur on, pave the way or affect the development of
populism. Indeed, this view of crisis as an external variable is the
mainstream view in political science, whereby we look for causal
relationships between discrete social or political phenomena.
However, there are two central problems with this view when it
comes to crisis. The ﬁrst is that the relations between crisis and
populism do not lend themselves to simple causal explanations. This is
due to crisis being a contested phenomenon that lacks clear and dis-
tinct boundaries; the fact that crisis itself is a product of complex
causality (Byrne and Uprichard 2012); and the aforementioned dif-
ference between crisis and the variables we associate with crisis (Mudde
2007). The second problem is that we cannot truly conceptualize a
‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ crisis that populism can be measured against.
This is not to say that there is ‘no such thing’ as crisis, but rather to
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acknowledge that we hit something of an ontological brick wall when
using the concept: we cannot separate ‘crisis’ from the words we use to
describe the phenomenon. To more widely invoke Slavoj Žižek’s
(1999) reading of Lacan – there may very well be a Real in which
crisis operates, but we cannot access it because our language remains
at the level of the Symbolic. As such, crisis is very much what we
make of it.
Given these ontological tensions, it is productive to move away
from ostensibly ‘objective’ notions of external crisis, and instead
towards a view of crisis as a phenomenon that can only be experi-
enced through performance and mediation, whereby a systemic
failure is elevated to the level of perceived ‘crisis’. In this light, the
performance of crisis should be seen as internal to populism – not
just as an external cause or catalyst for populism, but also as a central
feature of the phenomenon itself. This means that populist actors
actively perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis, rather than simply
reacting to external crisis. Moreover, this performance of crisis allows
populists an effective way to divide ‘the people’ and their other, and
to legitimate strong leadership by presenting themselves as voices of
the sovereign people.
There are traces of this argument of seeing populism as internal to
populism in the work of Paul Taggart (2000, 2002, 2004), who has
stressed that a sense of crisis is what the analyst of populism should be
interested in, rather than an objective notion of crisis itself. The
question of whether there ‘really is’ a crisis is not important – rather,
the key focus should be on populist actors’ ability to create a sense of
crisis and how they ‘use that sense to inject an urgency and an
importance to their message’ (Taggart 2004: 275). Carlos de la
Torre’s (2007, 2010) work on Latin American populism also acts as
an antecedent to this approach. Arguing against structuralist expla-
nations that see populism as a transitory developmental stage caused
by economic crises and upheaval, de la Torre (2010: 122) argues that
the appeal of populism ‘cannot be explained by the recurrence of a
reiﬁed notion of crisis . . . economic crises are experienced through
common people’s values, norms, and prejudices. The economy is
always culturally mediated.’ Both Taggart and de la Torre’s percep-
tive accounts of crisis and populism demonstrate that crisis is never
merely a ‘neutral’ phenomenon that is experienced ‘objectively’.
Rather, crisis is a phenomenon that is mediated and performed, and
experienced culturally and socially.
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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT CRISIS
Let us take a small step back, and make clear what we are actually
talking about when we use the term ‘crisis’. The term obviously has a
long history within the social sciences, with some of its better-known
theorists being Karl Marx (1981), Joseph Schumpeter (1942), Jürgen
Habermas (1975) and Antonio Gramsci (1971: 276), who viewed
crisis as the situation in which ‘the old is dying and the new cannot
be born’.
Reinhart Koselleck (2006) provides the most complete intellectual
history of the concept, tracing its etymological development from its
early Greek origins through Christian theology, French medical
grammar, the philosophy of history, German idealism and Marxist
theory among others. Put brieﬂy, its initial Greek root, krinō, referred
to a decisive moment – ‘a crucial point that would tip the scales’
(Koselleck 2006: 358) – as well as the subsequent action of reaching
a verdict. The key shift that Koselleck identiﬁes in the term’s devel-
opment is the way that this initial concept of crisis became imbued
with a sense of temporality in the late eighteenth century, meaning
that crisis was not only that initial moment of decision, but also ‘an
expression of a new sense of time which both indicated and inten-
siﬁed the end of an epoch’ (Koselleck 2006: 358). As such, crisis
became the name of the situation that necessitates a vital decision
that is seen as so signiﬁcant and all-encompassing as to both change
and delineate the course of history.
Janet Roitman (2011: online) captures the fusing of these two
senses of crisis in her theorization of the concept: ‘crisis is mobilized
in narrative constructions to mark out a “moment of truth” or as a
means to think “history” itself. Such moments of truth might be
deﬁned as turning points in history, when decisions are taken or
events are decided, thus establishing a particular teleology.’ However,
these ‘turning points’ or ‘moments of truth’ are never clear-cut
states of ﬂux or change: as Roitman stresses (2011: online), ‘evoking
crisis entails reference to a norm because it requires a comparative
state for judgment: crisis compared to what?’ As such, ‘there is not
“crisis” and “non-crisis,” which can be observed empirically’. The
attempt to determine objectively what ‘is’ or ‘is not’ a crisis is thus
a relatively fruitless exercise, as the concept relies on notions of
normality and stability that are themselves both culturally constructed
and speciﬁc.
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In contemporary usage, the way that crisis is most usually signiﬁed
is through linking it to failure – whether that be of the ﬁnancial
system, political system, public policy, democracy, representation,
masculinity and so on – and thus the impetus to act (or make the vital
decision) comes from the need to correct the failure and stem the
crisis. Yet failure and crisis are not one and the same – as Colin Hay
has argued, there is a need to analytically distinguish between the
two. While failure may provide ‘the structural preconditions for crisis’
(Hay 1995: 64), crisis is ‘a condition in which failure is identiﬁed and
widely perceived, a condition in which systemic failure has become
politically and ideationally mediated’ (Hay 1999: 324). In other
words, a crisis only becomes a crisis when it is perceived as a crisis –
when a failure gains wider salience through its mediation into the
political, cultural or ideological spheres and is commonly accepted as
symptomatic of a wider problem.
If we take this distinction between failure and crisis seriously, we can
see that those authors who claim that populism is spurred on by
structural or institutional crisis are often actually talking about failure –
they see populism as a result of a market failure or system failure,
rather than of market crisis or system crisis. In these cases, the term
‘crisis’ has been used uncritically, seen as an objective indicator of
disorder, chaos or breakdown. However, the symptoms and the diag-
noses have been mixed up here – the difference between failure and
crisis hinges on mediation. A failure does not automatically necessitate
a demand to act with immediacy and decisiveness. This demand to act
only emerges with crisis – that is, when the failure becomes culturally
or politically mediated and gains an important temporal dimension.
In other words, a crisis marks the spectacularization of failure – the
elevation of failure to crisis, in which the crisis becomes the foci for a
historical decision and action. As Taggart (2004: 282) notes, ‘the idea
of living at a turning point in history is an important one for populist
ideas’. From this point of view, crisis is a phenomenon that is mediated
and performed, and thus can be thought of as a key part of populism,
rather than just as something external to it.
PERFORMING CRISIS
So how do populist actors actually go about performing crisis? How,
in their language, framing and presentation, do they ‘spectacularize’
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failure? There are six major steps that populist actors use to elevate a
failure to the level of crisis, and in the process, seek to divide ‘the
people’ from those who are responsible for the crisis, present simple
solutions to the crisis and legitimate their own strong leadership as a
way to stave off or bring about an end to the crisis. In reality, these
steps do not necessarily proceed in this exact order, nor are they
always discrete – however, they have been separated here for analy-
tical utility.
These steps were discerned on an inductive basis, in which cases of
leaders who have been accepted as uncontroversial examples of
populist in the contemporary literature on populism were examined.
The reason for this approach is that while there is wide disparity in the
literature as to how to conceptualize populism, the actual cases of
actors that are usually called ‘populist’ are relatively undisputed and
tend to be repeated within the comparative literature. In other words,
while authors might disagree as to what populism is, they do not tend to
disagree about who populists are (Mofﬁtt and Tormey 2013).
The model of the populist ‘performance’ of crisis is as follows:
1 Identify failure.
2 Elevate to the level of crisis by linking into a wider framework and
adding a temporal dimension.
3 Frame ‘the people’ vs. those responsible for the crisis.
4 Use media to propagate performance.
5 Present simple solutions and strong leadership.
6 Continue to propagate crisis.
Identify Failure
The ﬁrst step is to identify or choose a particular failure and bring
attention to it as a matter of urgency. The ability to elevate a failure
to the level of crisis will probably be more successful if the chosen
failure already has some political salience. For example, in times of
economic instability, a populist actor may choose to focus on the
failure of the political class to protect ‘ordinary people’ from bankers.
At other times, sociocultural issues may prove more salient: for
example, the central issue that both Australian populist Pauline
Hanson and New Zealander populist Winston Peters initially chose to
focus on was the ‘failure’ of Asian immigration in their countries,
while Dutch populist Geert Wilders has focused primarily on the
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‘failure’ of Muslim immigration in the Netherlands. Another central
failure that populist actors often focus on is the failure of political
representatives or elites. This does not mean that populists are ‘single-
issue’ politicians, but rather that a particular failure is initially identiﬁed
as a way of gaining attention and building up a sense of crisis.
Elevate to the Level of Crisis by Linking into a Wider Framework and Adding
a Temporal Dimension
The next step is to link this chosen failure with other failures, thus
locating it within a wider structural or moral framework. In doing
this, populist actors attempt to make the failure appear symptomatic
of a wider problem, thus elevating the failure to the level of crisis.
Laclau has given us some indication of how this operation works in
his discussion of what he calls ‘demands’ in his theory of populist
logic. For Laclau (2005a: 74), an initial demand which remains
unanswered or unfulﬁlled by the actor, institution or system it is
addressed to (for example, a demand for reduced immigration levels
addressed to the government) will begin to be linked with other
unfulﬁlled demands in an ‘equivalential chain’. The further the
chain of equivalence between unfulﬁlled demands is extended, the
weaker the connection becomes to the initial particular demand. As
such, the initial demand begins to function as a ‘ﬂoating signiﬁer’
that represents the different demands entering the anti-systemic
chain of equivalence – it stands as the ‘general equivalent repre-
senting the chain as a whole’ (Laclau 2000: 302). It is this increasing
‘emptiness’ of the initial demand that is key to populism’s political
saliency: ‘the so-called “poverty” of the populist symbols is the con-
dition of their political efﬁcacy’ (Laclau 2005b: 40).
Laclau, however, does not explain how such demands become
linked together. Demands, or in our case, perceived failures, do not
simply link together in an automatic fashion but have to be actively
linked together – someone has to extend the ‘equivalential chain’.
This is where the performance of populist actors comes in. Through
mediated performance (whether a speech, rally, interview, written
piece, press release or other medium), populist actors link failures in
an attempt to homogenize a disparate set of phenomena as symp-
toms of a wider crisis, with these discrete ‘failures’ contextualized in
the form of a temporally bounded and signiﬁcant event.
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Two key examples illustrate the linkage of the failures as crisis
through performance by populists. The ﬁrst is that of Pauline Hanson’s
maiden speech to the Australian Parliament in 1996. Hanson managed
to link an astounding number of perceived failures together in this one
speech, including ‘the apparent existence of “reverse racism”, welfare
payments to Aboriginal Australians, multiculturalism, bureaucracy,
immigration, unemployment, foreign debt, living standards, family law,
privatisation of government assets, foreign aid, the United Nations,
government investment in large-scale development projects, national
military service, interest rates, and the (apparently threatening) status
and size of Asian nations surrounding Australia’ (Scalmer 2002: 149–50).
All of these failures were wrapped up in the central framework
of multiculturalism, which she labelled ‘a national disgrace and crisis’
(in Hansard 1996: col. 3862). This spectacle drew ‘unprecedented
Australian and international media attention’ (Ward et al. 2000: 2)
and successfully launched Hanson as a key player in Australian
politics, with her chosen ‘crisis’ of multiculturalism gaining a huge
amount of attention and debate.
Another example of linking issues through spectacle and perfor-
mance is the US Tea Party’s Taxpayer March on Washington, which
was held on 12 September 2009. While the initial issue that arguably
spurred the creation of the Tea Party was the Obama administra-
tion’s mortgage bailouts (as expressed by CNBC host Rick Santelli’s
rant at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange),3 the speeches at this
march extended to such issues as taxation, healthcare reform,
abortion, free-market capitalism and big government, while signs
held by the protestors compared Obama to Hitler and Stalin and
questioned his ‘true’ nationality. The overall concern here was not
just about bailouts – the initial ‘failure’ – but rather the looming crisis
that was to be brought about by Obama’s ‘socialist’ plan for the US,
taking in a number of heterogeneous issues.
An important temporal dimension underlies these performances
of crisis. Populists present their appeal as having to be enacted within
short timelines, without which terrible things will occur. This sense of
impending doom presents society at a precipice, which, if broached,
cannot be reversed. For example, in her maiden speech to parlia-
ment, Pauline Hanson claimed that ‘time is running out. We may
only have 10 to 15 years to turn things around’ (Hansard 1996: col.
3862) before Australia was doomed by multiculturalism. Sarah Palin
has argued that America is ‘at a crossroads’ (in Newton-Small 2011).
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Even more dramatically, Hugo Chávez claimed during the 1998
Venezuelan presidential election that ‘we are in the times of the
Apocalypse. You can no longer be on the side of the evil and the side
of God’ (quoted in Hawkins 2010: 55). The urgency of these claims
elevates the situation to one in which the crises must be dealt with
immediately, and decisions made in order to stave off the crisis,
rather than taking time to consider the many different options on the
table. The ‘slow politics’ (Saward 2011) of consensus and negotiation
are presented as ineffectual, while strong and decisive political
action, unencumbered by procedural checks and balances, are seen
as desirable.
The metaphors that are commonly used by populist actors in such
performances also reﬂect this urgency. Metaphors of contagion
or pathology, such as Pauline Hanson’s claim that Australia was ‘in
danger of being swamped by Asians’ (Hansard 1996: col. 3861) are
used alongside metaphors of natural disaster, such as Geert Wilders’s
claim (2013) that Western nations ‘must stand together, otherwise we
will be swept away by Islam’. As James Brassett and Chris Clarke
(2012) have argued, such metaphorical framing devices invoke a
sense of shared trauma and concern, with a common threat bringing
together ‘victims’ through a shared sense of vulnerability.
Frame ‘the People’ vs. those Responsible for the Crisis
Once the initial failure has been linked and elevated into a wider
framework of crisis, the populist actor is able to identify those who are
responsible for the crisis, and to set them against ‘the people’, who are
presented as being most negatively affected by the crisis. This is useful,
given that ‘the people’ often remains a vague signiﬁer, reliant on
identiﬁcation of the enemy in order to give meaning to ‘the people’s’
identity – as Taggart (2000: 94) argues, ‘populists are often more sure
of who they are not than of who they are. The demonization of social
groups, and particularly the antipathy towards the elite, provides
populists with an enemy, but it is also a crucial component of the
attempt to construct an identity.’
Indeed, the performance of crisis facilitates this group identiﬁca-
tion in two major ways. First, it allows populist actors a way of linking
the elite with the aforementioned social groups, who together are
portrayed in concert as being opposed to ‘the people’ in presenting,
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causing or perpetuating the crisis.4 For example, Western European
populist radical right actors, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, have tended to
focus their exclusionary efforts on non-native groups, such as the
Roma, Muslims or Turks, as well as on the elite, including bureaucrats,
journalists and academics. Similarly, the Reform Party of Canada used
a ‘crisis’ of Canadian democracy (Laycock 1994; Wegierski 1998) to
target the elite (in the form of old parties and bureaucrats) as well as
‘welfare mothers’, juvenile delinquents and ‘special interest groups’
among others who allegedly drain the country’s coffers (Laycock 2012).
In each of these cases, the elite is construed as designing, promoting
and advocating the policies that beneﬁt the minority groups who have
taken advantage of the situation, leading to a crisis that ultimately hurts
‘the people’.
Second, the performance of crisis offers populist actors a seemingly
‘objective’ rationale for targeting their enemies, beyond outright dis-
crimination. As noted, Hanson was able to demonize Asian immigrants
by linking them to the crisis of multiculturalism. Here she did not
explicitly attack the personal character of Asian immigrants, but rather
framed the need to stop immigration in order to ensure ‘that our dole
queues are not added to by, in many cases, unskilled migrants not
ﬂuent in the English language’ (in Hansard 1996: col. 3862). Geert
Wilders (in Traynor 2008) has framed his opposition to Islam in similar
terms: he claims, ‘I don’t hate Muslims – I hate Islam’, and has argued
for the need for the Dutch people to stand against the impending crisis
of the Islamization of Europe by invoking a threat to the cornerstones
of liberal democracy: ‘if we do not oppose Islamization, we will lose
everything: our freedom, our identity, our democracy, our rule of law,
and all our liberties. It is our duty to defend the legacy of Rome,
Athens, and Jerusalem’ (Wilders 2012: 216).
Use Media to Propagate Performance
Much of the success or failure of performing crisis relies on the
circulation of the populist’s performance through media. Indeed, the
media play a central role in the ‘breaking’ of a crisis, disseminating
information about crisis, and perpetuating a continuing sense of
crisis. However, media attention does not come easily in a media-
saturated age. As Linda Bos et al. (2010: 142–3) have shown in their
study of European radical right populist actors, to combat this
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situation and ‘get media attention, these politicians will have to be
somewhat unusual in their behaviour, style, or in terms of their
messages . . . By exploiting their novelty and outsider position, their
news value can in fact become very high, thereby assuring promi-
nence. Indeed, speaking as a harbinger of imminent doom or per-
petuating a critical threat can help to gain this vital media attention.’
One of the most obvious ways that populist actors promote and
perform a sense of crisis is through media events, designed as spectacles
to attract wide attention, garner salience for the particular threat, and
identify the enemies of ‘the people’. While Beata Ociepka (2005: 210)
argues that ‘populists often inspire media events by introducing issues
into the public discourse in order to launch the process of opinion
building’, they also go beyond ‘inspiration’ and actively promote or
stage these events as a central part of performing crisis. The small
political communication literature on populism provides us with some
evidence of the forms that these events take. They include press
conferences, radio or television appearances, speeches that privilege
‘hot button issues’ (Jenkins 2003: 158) such as immigration or crime,
and the making of inﬂammatory or controversial statements in public
arenas. For example, Gianpietro Mazzoleni (2008: 60) writes of ‘Bossi’s
neo-Celtic liturgies, Haider’s remarks about the Nazis and the Jews,
Fortuyn’s outspoken statements on Islam . . . [as] “newsworthy” realities
that the media will automatically cover in their pursuit of corporate
goals’, given that spectacle of creating crisis helps gain viewers, listeners
or readers due to their controversial or spectacular nature.
Indeed, these spectacles and performances ﬁt ﬁrmly within the
media’s pecuniary interests.5 A dramatized, salacious crisis obviously
makes for more entertaining reading or viewing than a sober and even-
handed account of an event. Mazzoleni (2008: 55) makes this mutually
beneﬁcial relationship between populist leaders and the media clear:
‘this convergence of goals sees the media pursuing their own corporate
ends by striking emotional chords on issues such as security, unem-
ployment, inﬂation, immigration and the like. At the same time, populist
leaders and their movements gain status, visibility and popular approval
by generating controversy, scufﬂing with incumbent political leaders and
resorting to inﬂammatory rhetoric.’ With many contemporary populist
parties, movements and leaders now having professional public relations
managers and media liaisons (Stewart et al. 2003), these links become
even more professionalized, and thus performances of crisis become
more sophisticated and spectacular.
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Other media events used by populists to perform crisis include
gatherings, marches or performative rituals (Biorcio 2003) that may
initially appear ‘unmediated’ – that is, as ‘grassroots’ events – but of
course then often gain a large degree of media attention due to the
spectacular nature of the event. Examples include the aforemen-
tioned Tea Party’s ‘9/12 Taxpayer March on Washington’ and the
2011 ‘Convoy of No Conﬁdence’ in Canberra, Australia, which was a
rural truck convoy motivated by a crisis of conﬁdence in the Gillard
government (Wear 2012).6 These seemingly ‘unmediated’ events
operate to give feelings of threat and crisis a semblance of legitimacy
by presenting ‘the people’ rather than populist leaders as the central
drivers of these concerns. Furthermore, some populist actors
directly use their own media channels to perform crisis, including
Thaksin Shinawatra or Toronto Mayor Rob Ford on their own radio
shows, or Hugo Chávez on his television show Aló Presidente!, with a
particularly illustrative example being when, in 2008, Chávez ordered
a general to send troops to the Colombian border, causing what
the New York Times called ‘a near-war and full-on diplomatic crisis’
(Nolan 2012).
Present Simple Solutions and Strong Leadership
Once a failure has been spectacularized, and a sense of crisis has
been created and propagated, the next important step is to present
oneself as having the solution to the crisis. Populist actors are able
to do this using a number of performative methods, including por-
traying other political actors as incompetent and feckless; offering
simple answers for the crisis; and advocating the simpliﬁcation of
political institutions and processes.
The portrayal of other political actors as incompetent and igno-
rant of the true urgency of the crisis allows populist actors to
position themselves as ‘straight-shooters’ who cut through the ‘bullshit’
(Frankfurt 2005) of mainstream politics, with ideological differences
and the actual practicalities of multiparty democracy being portrayed as
superﬂuous for the practice of governing in times of threat and
breakdown. Populists thus present themselves as being ‘beyond’
ideology or the minutiae of ‘everyday politics’, and rather focused on
the urgent crisis at hand, ready for action and armed with solutions. In
an example of this positioning, Silvio Berlusconi of Italy made clear that
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he was not interested in the ‘abstract principles’ or ‘complicated
ideology’ of party politics (in McCarthy 1996: 134) and claimed,
‘whenever I hear that Forza Italia is a party, I get shivers down my spine’
(Berlusconi 2000: 140). Similarly, in the run-up to the 2012 Republican
primaries in the US, Herman Cain declared, ‘I am not a politician, I’m a
problem solver’ (in Jones 2011), while fellow Tea Party candidate
Michelle Bachmann claimed, ‘I’m not a politician. I am a real person.
I don’t even know how to be a politician’ (in Johnson 2011). Such
manoeuvres allow populists to paint other politicians as self-interested and
disengaged from the ‘real world’ – caught up with reviews, reports,
community consultations, calls for tender and protracted implementation
– rather than seeking to put a deﬁnitive end to crisis.
The second performative method is the offering of simplistic
solutions to the crisis. These often take the form of what Pierre
Rosanvallon (2011) has called ‘a procedural and institutional sim-
pliﬁcation’ inherent in populism. Procedural simpliﬁcation is evident
in the often crude and immediate policy solutions offered by populist
actors in the effort to stop crises. An example of this can be found in
Geert Wilders’s ideas for solving the impending crime and immi-
gration ‘crisis’ in the Netherlands:
Problem: Moroccans throw stones at the Dutch Police.
Solution: Arrest them, prosecute them and deport them . . .
Problem: This government is breaking record after record in the area of mass
immigration.
Solution: Don’t allow in any more Eastern Europeans and shut the borders to
immigrants from Muslim countries. Now! . . .
Problem: Rotterdam, the second largest city in the Netherlands, will have an
immigrant majority by 2012.
Solution: Repatriation, repatriation, repatriation. What comes in can also
come out. (in de Bruijn 2011: 35)
The solutions offered by Peter Skaarup (2010), parliamentary
group chairman of the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti)
for stemming the Danish ﬁnancial crisis are equally simple: ‘if
non-western immigrants and descendants worked to the same
extent as the Danes, then the economic situation would immediately
be 24 billion Kroner [€3.2 billion] better, the sustainability problem
would be solved and the growth in the Danish economy would
explode’.
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The logic behind these solutions is simple: remove or eradicate
the enemy of ‘the people’, and the crisis will be either staved off
or solved. Žižek (2006: 555) explains this formulation: ‘the enemy
is externalized or reiﬁed into a positive ontological entity (even if
this entity is spectral) whose annihilation would restore balance
and justice’. In such formulations, the cause of the crisis is not the
system or general structure as such, but rather always the enemy. The
enemy of ‘the people’ thus is ‘the singular agent behind all threats
to the people’ (Žižek 2006: 556). In this way, populist conceptions
of crisis can be viewed as a refusal to deal with the complexity of
contemporary political life: rather than acknowledging that many
complex and intertwined factors cause systemic failures, the aim of
the populist performance of crisis is to point the ﬁnger squarely at
the enemy of ‘the people’. The key point is that somebody must be
responsible for this mess.
Institutional simpliﬁcation, meanwhile, is evident in the way popu-
list actors use crisis to attack and attempt to simplify the existing
political system because it is perceived as being perverted or corrupted.
Here, intermediary or unelected bodies that stand between ‘the
people’ and their elected representatives are seen as illegitimate, while
anything that stands in the way of ‘solving’ the crisis – such as the
political opposition or checks and balances – is to be bulldozed over.
This has been most obvious in those situations where populist leaders
have been able to win high ofﬁce. In Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra
used the Asian ﬁnancial crisis to great effect in this regard. Tejapira
details Thaksin’s ‘institutional simpliﬁcation’:
Making full use of his ﬁnancial resources, enhanced executive power and
overwhelming parliamentary majority, Thaksin lost no time in packing or
bending the constitutionally created bodies set up as checks and balances, to
undermine or neutralize their power. The government has intervened in
the selection of candidates for some of these organs, refused to co-operate
with them, obstructed their work or even offered them bribes. (Tejapira
2006: 28–9)
In Italy, Silvio Berlusconi similarly spent much of his time in ofﬁce
attempting to discredit the Italian judiciary, calling it ‘a dictatorship
of leftist judges’ (in Reuters 2011: online), and painting it as an
unnecessary and dangerous interference to the voice of the sovereign
people (Tarchi 2008). In Ecuador, under the guise of a ‘citizen’s
revolution’, President Rafael Correa illegally closed the Congress and
concentrated power in the Executive (de la Torre 2012).
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Continue to Propagate Crisis
It is difﬁcult to propagate and perform crisis continually: the efﬁcacy
of the invocation of crisis often stems from its episodic and ‘out of the
ordinary’ character, whereby crises are constructed as temporally
limited events. This presents a set of challenges for perpetuating
a sense of crisis – it can be difﬁcult to continue to attract attention
and prolong panic and concern about one’s chosen crisis, especially
if it becomes clear that one’s notion of crisis is not particularly con-
vincing, or if the issues that one’s notion of crisis revolve around
become less salient to voters or media. In an illustrative example of
this dilemma, Jens Rydgren (2006: 71) has shown that the failure of
the Swedish New Democracy party was due in a large part
to the 1990s economic crisis, which made socioeconomic issues far
more salient (particularly issues around Sweden’s political economy
and the welfare state) than the sociocultural issues that New
Democracy campaigned on (an immigration ‘crisis’), and thus saw it
suffer a humiliating defeat in the 1994 general elections.
One way that populists attempt to stem this loss of interest or sal-
ience is by switching the notion of crisis that they employ: for example,
in the 2012 Dutch elections, Geert Wilders temporarily attempted to
switch the focus of his party’s campaign from the crisis of the Islami-
zation of Europe to the European ﬁnancial crisis, advocating the
Netherlands’ exit from the European Union. Similarly, Pauline Hanson
has cycled through a number of impending crises from which Australia
is allegedly suffering – from an ‘Asian invasion’, to a health crisis
brought on by ‘diseased’ African immigrants, to a privatization crisis
caused by the selling-off of public services. These attempts to ‘switch’
crises have met with some degree of failure, with Wilders’s Party for
Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV) losing nine seats and 5 per
cent of its 2010 vote share in the 2012 election, and Hanson failing to
gain ofﬁce after 2001.7
Another tactic is to extend the purview and size of the crisis or
breakdown. Hugo Chávez was successful in doing this, beginning
with a breakdown of trust in regards to old party elites, moving on to
attacks on the domestic opposition, and then to a far-reaching
imperialist conspiracy spearheaded by the US (Hawkins 2010: 61).
This was met with increasing electoral success, perhaps because
Chávez was able to build up his notion of crisis in a gradual and linear
manner, rather than switching his focus suddenly. More so, this
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building of crisis implicated all of his enemies in a grander cosmic
scheme. More recently, de la Torre (2012) has argued that Rafael
Correa has extended his vision of his enemies and the crisis that
Ecuador allegedly faces in a similar way.
Of course, none of these tactics is guaranteed to work. Different
environments and audiences will prove more receptive to certain
types of performance of crises than others. While some populist
actors’ successes in performing crisis are short lived and of their
time, others (like Chávez and Correa) have been able to perpetuate
a sense of crisis over an extended period. This latter condition,
when successfully presented, can be rather effective, moving crisis
from being an extraordinary phenomenon to an ordinary one, thus
allowing these populist actors to strengthen their authority as the
sovereign voices of ‘the people’.
POPULIST PERFORMANCES OF CRISIS VS. ‘CRISIS POLITICS’
Taken together, this model of how populist actors go about per-
forming crisis raises an important question: how do such perfor-
mances differ from ‘crisis politics’ in general? In other words, what
makes these performances unique to populism? This is a particularly
timely question, given that we are living in the wake of the global
ﬁnancial crisis, and ‘crisis politics’ seems to be common across the
board in the so-called ‘age of austerity’ (Schäfer and Streeck 2013).
‘Crisis politics’ here can be understood as the type of politics
and responses outlined in Boin et al. (2005) that seek to deal with
large-scale crises – examples include the governance of cities after
natural disasters (such as Hurricane Katrina), political reactions to
terrorist attacks (such as the 11 September attacks), the politics of
large-scale disasters (such as the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster)
or the politics of responding and adapting to ﬁnancial crisis (such as
the Greek government-debt crisis).
There are two central differences that can be identiﬁed between
the performances of crisis that are a feature of populism, and ‘crisis
politics’ more generally: the centrality of ‘the people’ and the
necessary perpetuation of crisis. In regard to the ﬁrst, the primary
aim of populist performances of crisis is to divide ‘the people’ from
those ostensibly responsible for the crisis – whether that is the elite,
some dangerous other or a combination of both. If it does not
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succeed in this regard, the populist performance of crisis fails. This is
not the case for more general forms of ‘crisis politics’. They can invoke
‘the people’, but this is not necessarily the key political subject that all
forms of ‘crisis politics’ attempt to mobilize or ‘render-present’ (Arditi
2007). For example, ‘crisis politics’ can invoke subjects as different as
distinct classes (as in times of economic crisis), ethnicities (as in times
of ethnic conﬂict), religions (in times of religious conﬂict) or genders
(such as the ‘crisis of masculinity’) among others. None of these
political subjects needs to be couched in the language of ‘the people’
for ‘crisis politics’ to operate effectively. Related to this, the enemy of
these political subjects does not have to be the elite – this is culturally
and politically contingent.8 So while populist performances of crisis
always divide ‘the people’ from their other, ‘crisis politics’ more gene-
rally do not need to invoke ‘the people’.
Second, if populism is ‘a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme
crisis’, as Taggart (2000: 2) puts it, then its existence and continued
success is reliant on the continued propagation and perpetuation of
crisis. As has been argued, this means that we should see the perfor-
mance of populism as a core feature of populism, because its perpe-
tuation is necessary for populist actors’ political survival. This is simply
not the case for all other forms of ‘crisis politics’. Many forms of ‘crisis
politics’ blatantly seek to end the speciﬁed crisis at hand, rather than
continue to perpetuate it for political gain (’t Hart and Tindall 2009).9
For example, prolonging a sense of crisis is probably not in the interests
of leading political actors in some of the European countries that have
been hit the hardest by the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis, given that
they are facing disenchanted, desperate and disgruntled citizens – here,
an end to the crisis stands as the key goal. As such, while narratives
within more general forms of ‘crisis politics’ tend to have a broadly
teleological structure – they have a deﬁned beginning, middle and,
most importantly, end – the performances of crisis by populist actors
are ongoing, in that they either extend the scope of the crisis, or
alternatively switch their notion of crisis so that it continues. In other
words, populist performances of crisis never really end, unlike ‘crisis
politics’ in general.
At the same time, there are some overlaps between populist per-
formances of crisis and ‘crisis politics’ more generally that need to be
acknowledged. For example, some current non-populist examples of
forms of the ‘crisis politics’ of austerity have identiﬁed an initial
failure (step 1), linked it to a wider framework and added a temporal
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dimension (step 2), used the media to propagate the performance
(step 4) and presented simple solutions and leadership as a way of
solving the crisis (step 5). However, as noted above, what is missing in
such cases is a distinct focus on ‘the people’ versus their enemies
(step 3), as well as an active attempt to continue propagating the
crisis (step 6). The fact that populist performances of crisis and other
modes of ‘crisis politics’ in contemporary democracies share a
number of commonalities should not come as a surprise, given that
many authors have noted the interrelated nature of populism and
democracy, with populism being viewed as an ‘internal periphery’
(Arditi 2007), ‘mirror’ (Panizza 2005) or ‘spectre’ (Albertazzi and
McDonnell 2008) of democracy. Similarly, a number of authors
(Mazzoleni 2008; Mondon 2013; Snow and Mofﬁtt 2012) have noted
the ways that populism is becoming increasingly ‘mainstreamed’ in
contemporary democratic politics, indicating that populist and more
‘mainstream’ forms of politics can have much in common. However,
just as we do not identify all democratic politics as inherently populist
just because they share the same language of ‘the people’ at times,
neither should we collapse populist performances of crisis with all
forms of ‘crisis politics’ because they share some features. As
demonstrated, there are distinct differences between the two, and it
makes sense to keep them analytically separate.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that dominant conceptions of the relationship
between contemporary populism and crisis are only partial, as they
tend to view crisis as only external to populism. Instead, it has argued
that crisis should also be seen as an internal feature of populism, given
that crises are never ‘neutral’ events, but are actively mediated and
performed by populist actors who attempt to ‘spectacularize’ failure to
propagate a sense of crisis. Having outlined the mechanisms of this
performance, it has shown that this performance allows populists
a method for dividing ‘the people’ against a dangerous other, for
presenting themselves as the sovereign voice of ‘the people’ and for
radically simplifying political procedures and institutions. It must be
stressed that the performance of crisis should not be viewed just as a
particular political strategy among others that populists can choose to
deploy if they feel it would politically advantageous – rather, the
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performance of crisis should be seen as an essential core feature of
populism itself.
This argument has a number of ramiﬁcations for thinking about
populism. First, it makes clear the centrality of performance in con-
temporary populism, lending credence to those conceptions that view
populism as a political style (Filc 2011; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Mofﬁtt
and Tormey 2013; Taguieff 1995). Indeed, the theoretical arguments
and empirical examples utilized in this article demonstrate that crisis
can only become a crisis through performance or mediation. Second, it
provides a more nuanced notion of crisis to be applied in the populist
literature, showing that crisis can be thought of as an external trigger as
well as an internal feature of populism. Third, it demonstrates that the
performance of crisis helps to divide the ‘the people’ from their other,
in that it can link the elite and other minority groups together and can
offer populists a seemingly ‘objective’ rationale for targeting ‘the peo-
ple’s’ enemies. Fourth, it presents an analytical model of the steps that
populist actors take in performing crisis, which can be tested and
applied to different cases of populism across the world. Fifth, it shows
that there are differences between the ways that populists perform crisis
and ‘crisis politics’ more generally.
In a world that is allegedly beset by a number of crises, this shift in
perspective allows us to question arguments about the simple causality
between populism and crisis, and to interrogate the very notion of crisis
as a discrete and objective phenomenon. By addressing the performa-
tive repertoires, practices of mediation and role of spectacle inherent
in populist use of crisis, we are better equipped to understand the
phenomenon in the future, and to discern more clearly its increasingly
important position in the contemporary political landscape.
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NOTES
1 See Townshend (2003, 2004) for an explanation of the Essex School of discourse analysis.
2 Panizza (2005: 14) is an exception: despite editing a Laclau and Essex School-centric
collection on populism, he is keen to note that crisis can lead to many outcomes
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other than populism, such as authoritarianism, dictatorship or, more positively, a
renewal of democratic political institutions.
3 This is commonly accepted as the key motivating ‘event’ that spurred on the
formation of the US Tea Party movement (Lo 2012).
4 This is in line with Albertazzi and McDonnell’s depiction (2008: 3) of the key division
at the heart of populism as being between ‘the people’ and ‘a set of elites and
dangerous “others” who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to
deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice’.
5 An example of the disproportionate amount of media coverage given to a populist
actors is that of Tea Party candidate Herman Cain, who in 2011, according to the Pew
Research Center, was the most covered Republican candidate in the US media, and
indeed, the third most covered ﬁgure overall, after Barack Obama and Muammar
Gaddaﬁ (Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism 2011).
6 Both of these events have been argued to be ‘astroturf’ – a play on the term
‘grassroots’ which refers to ‘the artiﬁcial formation of apparently spontaneous
grassroots movements by private interests’ (Wear 2012: 1). In these cases, such
private interests included business interests such as the Koch brothers’ Freedom-
works, and media actors – former Fox News host Glenn Beck in the case of the 9/12
Taxpayer March on Washington, and shock-jock Alan Jones in the case of the Convoy
of No Conﬁdence.
7 However, this does not necessarily mean that changing tack in terms of crisis is always
a negative experience. According to recent opinion polls, at the time of writing (July
2013), Wilders’s Party for Freedom is the second most popular party in the
Netherlands (Louwerse 2013).
8 In some situations, the elite can even be portrayed as the victims of crisis: for example,
the US Justice Department has depicted a number of banks (including divisions of
Citigroup and Bank of America) as victims of Standard & Poor’s credit ratings during
the ﬁnancial crisis – a new twist on the usual narratives that have emerged from the
global ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal (2013) went so far as to state, ‘The
Feds Discover a New Crisis Narrative’ in its headline for the story. It is rather difﬁcult to
imagine populist actors presenting the elite as victims of crisis.
9 There are, however, some forms of non-populist politics that seek to perpetuate crisis
and ‘normalize’ it to create a permanent ‘state of exception’. See Agamben (2005)
for examples and discussion of this phenomenon.
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